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What Worked In Iraq May Not Work In Afghanistan
By John J. Tsucalas, For The Bulletin
The situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan is confusing, so we can wonder whether we’re victims of the political interplay between the two countries or a conspiracy among them, especially precarious when the former nation has a nuclear capability. If we lose control over the former to militants,the situation could become lethal and dangerous for the whole region.
Inside Pakistan, there is a powerful spy agency that is the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (DISI). The DISI is dangerous, for it could seize power in Pakistan in a coup d’état. It is suspected of having ties to the Taliban and is, thus, actually a threat to our prospects in Afghanistan.
Moreover, Pakistan and the Taliban have executed agreements that would have Muslim law (Shariah) dominant in the Northwest Frontier province of the former, near the border with Afghanistan. Nonetheless, this is the battle of choice for President Barack Obama and the Congress, even though we are winning in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan. As Sen. John McCain has observed, if you’re not winning, you’re losing. He has correctly added that an increase in our forces necessitates a change in strategy.
What worked in Iraq may not be applicable to Afghanistan. Indeed, the 30,000 injection of troops, now known as the surge, did not reverse the fortunes of war except indirectly. It altered the dynamics of battle, causing Sunni Arabs to turn against al-Qaida to the latter’s near total destruction in Anbar province.
In Pakistan, further complicating matters, former Prime Minister, now opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif, and Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, widower of the assassinated, Benazir Bhutto, are in opposition to one another. The contention between the two was prompted by Mr. Sharif’s support of reinstatement for former chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudry, who had been ousted by former president, Pervez Musharraf. It is expected that Mr. Sharif, who had been barred from office by the supreme court because of prior corruption allegations, will be newly eligible for office, made so by Mr. Chaudry.
However, there is suspicion that Mr. Sharif is not sufficiently anti-Islamist to be valuable to us in the fight against jihadists. I can’t think of anyone there who is of value to us, including Americans. They are Richard Holbrooke, special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Leon Panetta, director of the CIA. The two Americans need training in the relationship of diplomacy or spying to battle. The question of value also goes for Afghanistan where its president, Hamid Karzai, is of doubtful worth. Look at the nations of Pakistan and Afghanistan and their leaders as one, adding to one gigantic problem for us. However, we’re sending additional forces to Afghanistan, say another 21,000 troops, to questionable avail. There is in battle a concept called, “economy of force,” developed by the great military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz. It means waste nothing and use all resources efficiently. One related observation: There is a serious management problem of our coalition forces in Afghanistan to which I have called attention in previous columns; but, without getting the solution it deserves. This is European allies deciding what battles and areas of Afghanistan in which they will fight. This is a management problem, not a tactical one; it lends itself easily to handling, but by tough diplomacy. It should be for our president’s priority number one.
With the increase we’re planning, we’ll be wasting a lot of time and I fear lives, also, of our troops. In the final analysis, send a few more Special Forces (SF) and many aircraft, say F-16 Fighting Falcons (USAF), and let Mr. Karzai vent over civilian casualties. The job can be still done there by SF and USAF; and, that job is victory. With presidential elections scheduled in Afghanistan for August of this year, there have to be more votes in talking about civilian casualties than about institutional corruption and the poppy trade, which, in any event, do not seem to bother Mr. Karzai.
We have lost 673 troops to death in Afghanistan. Additionally, latest reports have us spending $2 billion per month on that battle. By contrast, the Taliban are running up $100,000 monthly, funded substantially by the poppy trade.
This is the war of choice? I pray that I am wrong; but, add another 21,000 troops and our death count by enemy fire will skyrocket, along with Mr. Karzai’s civilian casualty numbers, that, as he should know, would be derived from inadvertent collateral damage. We are not intentionally killers of civilians, especially women and children.
We will win this one. I only wonder if we’re getting our priorities right and doing this as rapidly as we should. The faster we achieve this goal of winning, the lower will be our casualty count. This is quite an incentive.
John J. Tsucalas, former deputy auditor general of Pennsylvania, is a Philadelphia corporate consultant on finance. He can be reached at tsucalas@verizon.net.
Inside Pakistan, there is a powerful spy agency that is the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (DISI). The DISI is dangerous, for it could seize power in Pakistan in a coup d’état. It is suspected of having ties to the Taliban and is, thus, actually a threat to our prospects in Afghanistan.
Moreover, Pakistan and the Taliban have executed agreements that would have Muslim law (Shariah) dominant in the Northwest Frontier province of the former, near the border with Afghanistan. Nonetheless, this is the battle of choice for President Barack Obama and the Congress, even though we are winning in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan. As Sen. John McCain has observed, if you’re not winning, you’re losing. He has correctly added that an increase in our forces necessitates a change in strategy.
What worked in Iraq may not be applicable to Afghanistan. Indeed, the 30,000 injection of troops, now known as the surge, did not reverse the fortunes of war except indirectly. It altered the dynamics of battle, causing Sunni Arabs to turn against al-Qaida to the latter’s near total destruction in Anbar province.
In Pakistan, further complicating matters, former Prime Minister, now opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif, and Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, widower of the assassinated, Benazir Bhutto, are in opposition to one another. The contention between the two was prompted by Mr. Sharif’s support of reinstatement for former chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudry, who had been ousted by former president, Pervez Musharraf. It is expected that Mr. Sharif, who had been barred from office by the supreme court because of prior corruption allegations, will be newly eligible for office, made so by Mr. Chaudry.
However, there is suspicion that Mr. Sharif is not sufficiently anti-Islamist to be valuable to us in the fight against jihadists. I can’t think of anyone there who is of value to us, including Americans. They are Richard Holbrooke, special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Leon Panetta, director of the CIA. The two Americans need training in the relationship of diplomacy or spying to battle. The question of value also goes for Afghanistan where its president, Hamid Karzai, is of doubtful worth. Look at the nations of Pakistan and Afghanistan and their leaders as one, adding to one gigantic problem for us. However, we’re sending additional forces to Afghanistan, say another 21,000 troops, to questionable avail. There is in battle a concept called, “economy of force,” developed by the great military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz. It means waste nothing and use all resources efficiently. One related observation: There is a serious management problem of our coalition forces in Afghanistan to which I have called attention in previous columns; but, without getting the solution it deserves. This is European allies deciding what battles and areas of Afghanistan in which they will fight. This is a management problem, not a tactical one; it lends itself easily to handling, but by tough diplomacy. It should be for our president’s priority number one.
With the increase we’re planning, we’ll be wasting a lot of time and I fear lives, also, of our troops. In the final analysis, send a few more Special Forces (SF) and many aircraft, say F-16 Fighting Falcons (USAF), and let Mr. Karzai vent over civilian casualties. The job can be still done there by SF and USAF; and, that job is victory. With presidential elections scheduled in Afghanistan for August of this year, there have to be more votes in talking about civilian casualties than about institutional corruption and the poppy trade, which, in any event, do not seem to bother Mr. Karzai.
We have lost 673 troops to death in Afghanistan. Additionally, latest reports have us spending $2 billion per month on that battle. By contrast, the Taliban are running up $100,000 monthly, funded substantially by the poppy trade.
This is the war of choice? I pray that I am wrong; but, add another 21,000 troops and our death count by enemy fire will skyrocket, along with Mr. Karzai’s civilian casualty numbers, that, as he should know, would be derived from inadvertent collateral damage. We are not intentionally killers of civilians, especially women and children.
We will win this one. I only wonder if we’re getting our priorities right and doing this as rapidly as we should. The faster we achieve this goal of winning, the lower will be our casualty count. This is quite an incentive.
John J. Tsucalas, former deputy auditor general of Pennsylvania, is a Philadelphia corporate consultant on finance. He can be reached at tsucalas@verizon.net.
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